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Personalist regimes tend to be violently overthrown while single party states tend to non-
violently collapse from within. This paper analyzes Libya under Qaddafi as a personalist regime, 
and USSR under Gorbachev as a single party state, and seeks to ascertain through case studies 
and process tracing the reasons for the violent overthrow of personalist regimes compared to the 
peaceful collapse of single party regimes. Both regime types create the problems that result in 
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Personalist regimes tend to be violently overthrown, while single party regimes tend to collapse 
from peacefully from within. This paper hypothesizes that the natures of the regimes are such 
that they can collapse in no other way. Single party regimes collapse inward onto themselves, 
while personalist regimes push the people to violent revolution. Regimes that have built broad 
social coalitions have the capacity to deal with discontent, whereas states that use force to ensure 
compliance lack social coalitions and have no other choice but to resort to repression in order to 
survive (Gurses and Mason, 2010, p. 146). Single party regimes possess these coalitions, 
personalist regimes do not. Personalist regimes are unstable, and by their nature are forced to 
employ violence in a manner that leads them to the point of violent revolution. Single party 
regimes are stable, but their stability hampers their ability to adapt to new changes; when they 
can no longer manage rising obstacles, opposition arises, but the opposition itself is not the real 
threat to the system, but rather the fact that legitimate opposition was ever allowed to arise, 
because this a sign that the system that sustains the state is broken. I hypothesize that Personalist 
regimes are overthrown violently because they allow no avenue for peaceful political input and 
push people to the point where they are willing to face violence, while Single Party regimes 
collapse relatively peacefully because legitimate opposition can only arise when the system is 
already broken. In this paper, I use case studies and process tracing of the USSR after Stalin 






Single Party Regimes 
 
Single party regimes are states “in which the party has some influence over policy, controls most 
access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organization” 
(Gurses & Mason, 2010, p. 143). In single-party regimes, access to political office and control 
over policy are dominated by one party, though other parties may legally exist and compete in 
elections (Gurses & Mason, 2010, p. 143). Single-party regimes are resilient and are more likely 
to collapse due to exogenous events rather than internal splits (Geddes, 1999, p. 131).  Single 
party regimes endure on average almost 23 years: they are the most stable of authoritarian 
regimes; this may be because “the presence of limited decisional constraints in single-party 
regimes may make them more peaceful in general (Geddes, 1999, p. 131). 
The single party system is an efficient bureaucratic machine that excels at repressing rebellion 
before it can become a threat, or putting down threats with such extreme force that it serves as an 
effective warning. Single party states have their strength in the efficiency of the machine like 
system: people are only cogs, and can be replaced; this also helps the system remain elastic 
enough to last as long as it does; when “the old guard” forgets that it is not people that matter, 
but the system, they irreparably damage it. If serious popular opposition arises in a single party 
regime, it is a sign that the system is already broken and ready to collapse on itself. If a single 
state regime is working properly, it will effectively crush opposition before it becomes a serious 
threat. It is not the rebellion that overthrows single party regimes, but the fact that the system 
allowed a rebellion to arise. Violent opposition does sometimes arise in single party, but it is 
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either repressed before it becomes a serious issue, or treated disproportionately harshly to act as a 
warning, as in the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968 (White, 2001, p. 66).  
When the USSR ignored opposition and the growing dissent/changes because it was afraid to use 
force they revealed their weakness and accelerated their own overthrow. They had been able to 
conceal their weakness previously, but once opposition rose, the cracks started to show. They 
lacked the ruthlessness necessary to maintain power, but their reforms were too weak and half-
hearted to make them democratic or to pacify the people. Their reforms only served to show that 
the system was too weak and broken to continue repression, and too attached to the old ways to 
keep up with the times. Glasnost, or policy of openness, showed that the Communist party was 
not the undisputed moral or political power. The party could not withstand open criticism, and 
the changes they made only served to show the weakness inherent in the system. Nevertheless, 
the greater inherent stability of the single party state means that it usually non-violently collapses 
through its own brittleness rather than being violently overthrown.   
Personalist Regimes 
 
A personalist regime a state in which the leader, who often came to power by means of a military 
coup or as the leader of a single party government, has consolidated control of the government 
and state into his hands alone, and reduced the importance the input of other members of the 
government; such states are most vulnerable to civil war and revolution (Gurses & Mason, 2010, 
p. 144). Personalist regimes survive about 15 years on average (Geddes, 1999, p. 131): they are 
relatively immune to internal splits except when dire economic conditions disrupt regime loyalty, 
they are especially vulnerable, however, to the death of the leader and to violent overthrow (p. 
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131). Personalist leaders do not usually need to worry about reelection: they can repress 
demonstrations, ignore public opinion, and abolish un-cooperative legislatures (Peceny & Beer, 
2003, p. 340), and “It is reasonable to assume that autocratic leaders are more likely to pursue 
repression since they are unfettered by countervailing institutions” (Regan & Henderson, 2002, 
p. 121).  
Personalist leaders often have no other way of maintaining power except through repression, but 
this repression leaves no avenue for dissent or peaceful political input, so the only way for the 
populace to affect change is through violence. Personalist leaders who maintain their power 
through violence are forced to escalate that violent repression until they push the people to the 
point where they have nothing to lose, and are ready to risk anything to overthrow the leader. 
Violence as a method of suppression leaves the regime vulnerable because, having already used 
their ultimate weapon of suppression, they are constantly at full threat, and have no further 
weapons, and if they do not maintain firm control, they leave themselves open to attacks they 
can’t win. Personalist leaders are often erratic and unpredictable, making them more susceptible 
to overthrow than the much more stable single party states. Qaddafi’s repression and erratic use 
of violence pushed the people to the point where they were willing to revolt, and when that point 
came, he was not able to control the situation. His apparent inability to control the situation made 








In this paper, “revolution” refers to a change of social or political structure that is not necessarily 
accomplished through violence. Revolutions are generally more likely in states that suffer from 
“weak-state syndrome,” where some sector of society does not recognize the government as 
legitimate and the state lacks the capacity or will to respond to the challenge to its legitimacy 
(Gurses and Mason, 2010, p. 145). ). Revolutions are due to “widespread, intense, and multi-
faceted relative deprivation that touches both masses and elite aspirants” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 10), 
but they will not come into being unless “the existing social structure comes into crisis” (p. 12). 
Violence occurs when “many people in society become angry….and people become angry when 
there occurs a gap between the valued things and opportunities they feel entitled to and the things 
and opportunities they actually get” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 9).  
Regimes characterized with repressive policies (such as personalist and single party) are more 
vulnerable to collapse and more prone to violence than democracies (Gurses and Mason, 2010, p. 
146). Regimes that have built broad social coalitions have the capacity to deal with discontent, 
whereas states that use force to ensure compliance lack social coalitions and no other choice but 
to resort to repression in order to survive (Gurses and Mason, 2010, p. 146). Strong authoritarian 
regimes can be repressive enough to deter political dissent while democracies provide peaceful 
avenues for political influence and face constraints on the use of force (Cunningham, Gleditsch, 
& Salehyan, 2009, p. 576). Weak authoritarian regimes are conflict-prone because of the 
“combination of insufficient repressiveness to deter insurrection and a lack of political openness” 
(Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009, p. 576). Allowing political dissent while not 
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offering viable avenues for political influence (as Glasnost did) makes regimes appear weak and 
makes them more vulnerable to collapse. The USSR collapsed non-violently when it lacked the 
will to repress dissent, and allowed dissent without offering a viable alternative to the current 
flawed system. Qaddafi used violence to maintain his power, but his erratic behavior undermined 
his legitimacy and united his supporters with his enemies.  
Single party regimes rarely come to the point of violent revolution. They are usually strong 
regimes with the ability to put down dissent. They are rarely faced with revolutionary challenges 
because they do not tolerate the mobilization of any form of autonomous social organization that 
could evolve into a threatening opposition movement (Gurses & Mason, 2010, p. 143). Single 
party regimes are incredibly efficient machines that repress dissent and run on, regardless of the 
will of the people. Although they are often repressive, they are also more flexible than other 
authoritarian regimes, allowing new people into the party (rather than holding on to power like 
the personalists), this allows them to adapt to the times and last longer. 
Personalist regimes are often characterized by the erratic behavior of their leaders, perhaps 
because “of the absence of even the most limited decisional constraints in personalist regimes” 
(Peceny & Beer, 2003, p. 342). Personalist leaders maintain authority that is unrestrained by law 
or ideology; the distinction between the leaders private interests and the interests of the state are 
purposely blurred, loyalty to the leader is based on fear and or greed, and the leader does not 
tolerate creation of autonomous groups in society and does not grant autonomy to government 
agencies or to the economic sector (Gurses & Mason, 2010, p. 144). The leader can arbitrarily 
intervene wherever and whenever he chooses and without justification or explanation, this 
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creates opposition from “the military and economic elite, from landlords, businessmen, clerics, 
and professionals who resent the leader’s heavy handed control” (Gurses & Mason, 2010, p. 
144); this makes personalist regimes especially vulnerable to defections by the military and 
middle class citizens. Violent revolutions are likely in personalist regimes because the leaders’ 
corruption and arbitrary and self-serving actions alienate the people and weaken his supporters 
(Gurses & Mason, 2010, p. 145). Violent personalist regimes leave the people little choice but to 



















In this paper I used case studies and process tracing to test my hypothesis that personalist 
regimes end violently and single party regimes end peacefully because each type of regime 
invariably creates the problems that lead them to end as their regime type must: personalists 
violently, single parties peacefully.  
The case studies I chose for this paper were the USSR after Stalin (1953-1991), particularly 
focusing on Gorbachev, and Libya under Colonel Qaddafi (1969-2011). When choosing my 
cases, I excluded countries with monarchies because though the leader in a monarchy has great 
personal power, he is supported by society and therefore has legitimacy and stability that a 
personalist leader lacks. I looked for regimes that were easily defined as personalist or single 
party, had the major characteristics of their type, and had already collapsed or been overthrown. 
For these reasons, I did not analyze the USSR under Stalin, as his cult of personality made the 
USSR a hybrid regime with strong personalist characteristics, rather than a pure single party 
regime. I looked for countries that collapsed independently of one another so that the collapse of 
the regimes could be analyzed independently of one another. Romania, for example, was a 
personalist regime that was violently overthrown, but it was not overthrown in isolation from the 
USSR, and could not be analyzed separately, making it inappropriate for this paper. Likewise for 
single party Eastern European countries (i.e. Hungary) that collapsed peacefully, their downfalls 
were too closely connected to one another to analyze separately. Also important was making sure 
the case had accessible information in English, and as I was looking at recent cases, I looked for 
cases where relations with the West meant that the lifespan and end of the regime were well 
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documented in Western newspapers, books, and journals. The USSR, as possibly the most 
famous example of a single party regime, had all the characteristics of its regime type, and due to 
its hegemonic rivalry with the US and the threat it posed during its day, its end was well 
documented in English. Libya under Qaddafi had all the characteristics of a personalist regime, 
and the relationship of the United States with Libya meant that despite the regime’s notorious 
restriction of press, there was still documentation from the US government and Western 
Newspapers. The significance of the Libyan revolution to other countries in the region also made 
it easier to get information for this case, as countries in the region followed the events of the 
revolution closely.  
I hypothesized that by the time single party regimes collapse, they are already broken, since if 
the system were working, they would use the party apparatus to crush dissent before it became 
opposition. When gathering information, I looked for evidence of breaks in the single party 
system that would show that the regime was broken before it collapsed. In the case of the USSR 
the evidence of the party’s frailty and fossilization that I found were: weak reforms that did little 
but highlight the party’s failings; bureaucratic resistance to the reforms without offering viable 
alternatives; reluctance to either use force to repress dissent or to reform sufficiently enough to 
make force unnecessary; in-party fighting; and the party’s choice of leaders who were 
insufficiently committed to too weak reform (Khrushchev and Gorbachev), whose clinging to the 
old ways kept the party stagnant (Brezhnev), or frail leaders who were dying along with the party 
(Andropov and Chernenko). I used newspaper articles written during the regime’s lifetime, 




I hypothesized that since personalist leaders lack the legitimacy and stability of the single party, 
and do not have the social coalitions that the single party uses to repress dissent, they are forced 
to use violence against every little threat, but this is a short term solution that exacerbates the 
situation and eventually pushes the regime into a violent revolution that it cannot withstand. 
When gathering information, I looked for evidence that Qaddafi was erratic and violent, had 
unchecked power, and alienated all portions of society that a single party regime would have 
used to maintain the legitimacy of the regime and repress dissent. In my research I found that 
Qaddafi interfered in every aspect of society, angering the bureaucracy and military by regularly 
threatening to disband them and violently punishing dissenters in their ranks, drawing the ire of 
religious leaders by insisting that he was linked to the prophets but that religion came second to 
his decrees, upsetting the middle class by interfering and damaging the economy, and angering 
everyone in the country by demanding that everyone follow his every whim, from raising 
chickens to closing businesses. I mainly used newspaper articles as the event was so recent that 
newspapers still have the most information, but I also found information in Qaddafi’s Green 
Book, research from NGOs, and books written early in Qaddafi’s reign and after the collapse of 








THE USSR UNDER GORBACHEV AS A SINGLE PARTY REGIME 
 
The party-state was more powerful than the tsarist regime it had overthrown, and was capable of 
doing more in society while paying even less attention to social opposition (Skocpol, 1979, p. 
226). This was for several reasons: it was more efficiently controlled, and was larger in numbers 
with a larger reach (Skocpol, 1979, p. 226). The Soviet regime relied on “administratively 
organized coercion and terror as techniques for ruling its citizenry” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 230), 
seeing state coercion as a powerful tool to repress popular forces and revolutionary movements 
(p. 26). The USSR was a highly centralized and bureaucratic party state which propelled rapid 
national industrialization through command and terror (Skocpol, 1979, p. 207). All aspects of 
public life in the USSR were dominated by the ruling single party (White, 2001, p. 18). There 
was public ownership of means of production; widespread censorship, repression of dissent, and 
a party wide refusal to admit that the government was anything but perfect (White, 2001, p. 18).  
The USSR was more personalist than single party under Stalin, thanks to his cult of personality 
and nearly unlimited personal power. Once Stalin had defeated his opposition, he was able to 
wield “unchallenged personal control of the Communist party and the Soviet State” (Daniels, 
1984, p. 215). He imposed stringent control over intellectual life, imprisoning nonconformist 
thinkers, and ridding himself of anyone in his way during the purges (Daniels, 1984, p. 219). The 
death of Stalin in 1953 followed protests and a call for moderation (White, 2001, p. 21). Fearing 
that Malenkov would inherit Stalin’s dictatorial power, the party reorganized and Nikita 
Khrushchev took the post of First Secretary, and the party became a collective leadership 
(Daniels, 1984, p. 312).  
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Under Khrushchev, the party began a period of “De-Stalinization,” and in 1956, Khrushchev 
admitted that the Communist party had made mistakes, shedding the “aura of infallibility” the 
party had assumed since its beginning (Daniels, 1984, p, 322). Khrushchev said in his Secret 
Speech that “Stalin acted not only through persuasion, explanation, and patient operation with 
the people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion” 
(Daniels, 1984, V1, p. 322); he further called Stalin a man of “despotic character” (p 322) who 
had violated revolutionary legality when he practiced mass repression through the government 
apparatus (p. 323). “The Thaw” instituted under Khrushchev allowed significantly more freedom 
than under Stalin, but the reforms were not enough to give real freedom, and the party was not 
sufficiently committed either to reform or repression for either one to work.  
Eventually the party, fearing that Khrushchev had acquired too much personal power, and 
disliking his reforms, ousted him and returned to a stricter way of life (Daniels, 1984, p. 347). 
Khrushchev was replaced by Brezhnev in 1964, beginning an “era of stagnations” for the USSR, 
the limited relaxation of party control under Khrushchev was abruptly ended and the party 
returned to ideological conformity (Daniels, 1984, p. 362). Under Brezhnev, the global influence 
of the USSR grew even stronger, but his aversion to change and desire to cling to the old ways 
kept the USSR stagnant. Brezhnev was replaced by the elderly Andropov in 1982, who died two 
years later (Daniels, 1984, p. 429). Andropov was replaced by an even older man, Chernenko, 
who died less than two years after gaining power (Daniels, 1984, p. 432).  
The USSR’s choice of leaders shows that the system was very broken by that time. The single 
party’s strength lies in its ability to let new people in, keeping the system from stagnating, and its 
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focus on the apparatus rather than on individuals or “the old guard,” keeps the machine-like 
system rolling on despite turmoil in the world. When the party chose for its leaders men who 
were stuck in the old ways, averse to change, and lacking the energy to put down opposition, 
they were crippling the system by letting it die of old age and tiredness. The party was unwilling 
to return to Stalin’s methods of repression, but was not willing to adapt the system for less harsh 
methods of repression or to allow freedom and dissent.  
Gorbachev’s accession to power marked a time of change. He launched a campaign for 
restructuring (perestroika), and on finding that it could not be implemented without allowing 
public criticism, implemented “glasnost,” allowing intellectuals and the press freedom to 
criticize the government (Daniels, 1984, p. 432). Perestroika began as a program of limited 
change aimed at improving the current system, not as a radical overturn (Daniels, 1995, p. xxiii). 
Perestroika aimed for the reconstruction of political and economic central powers, but without 
changing the basic principles of the regime (Suraska, 1998, p. 141). Glasnost called on the media 
to criticize the government for “shortcomings, inefficiency and abuse of power,” while still 
maintaining political power in the hands of the party (Goldfarb, 1987). Gorbachev said that “no 
society can exist without glasnost” because without it, the government had no way to “check up” 
on itself, and would keep sliding back into the past (Daniels, 1984, p. 436-7). Gorbachev 
conceded that USSR polices had been mistaken for the past twenty years (White, 2001, p. 58), 
and allowed more input from the people. He encouraged the public to criticize the system and 
openly criticized it himself.  
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Gorbachev criticized the system and its leaders, past and present. According to Gorbachev, the 
USSR was “a society whose ruling circles refuse to assess the realities of the world and its 
perspective in sober terms” and was held back from change by “social senility” (“Excerpts,” 
1986). According to Gorbachev, the economic machinery lacked the “inner stimuli for self-
development” (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 85). Gorbachev blamed failings by the ruling elite for the 
“lag in the Soviet economy, the creation of a cumbersome and self-perpetuating bureaucracy and 
public skepticism about its leaders” (Associated Press, 1988). And attempts to change had “been 
hampered by an addiction to habitual formulas and schemes, which did not reflect the new 
realities” (Associated Press, 1988).  
Under Gorbachev, censorship was relaxed, criticism in the press was encouraged, and dissent 
was tolerated (Taubman, 1987). Prisoners held for criticizing the government were released and 
pardoned, repressive policies created under Stalin were lifted, and books dealing more honestly 
with the Stalin era and with “moral decay in the government” were released with Gorbachev’s 
consent (Taubman, 1987).  
Gorbachev stopped the requirement for worship of past leaders, with Soviet authorities removing 
Brezhnev’s name from places of honor in Moscow as Gorbachev criticized him for saddling the 
USSR with “bureaucracy and stagnation” (Associated Press, 1988). He was however, mindful 
that Khrushchev’s pointed criticism of Stalin and attempts to change the system had led to his 
downfall (Taubman, 1987), and was aware of the risk the bureaucrats posed. 
The bureaucracy hindered change, preferring to hold onto the old ways and look out for their 
own interests, and as the party reached its crisis, the KGB, the military, and the party members 
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continued their feuds rather than unite, contributing to the collapse of the state (Suraska, 1998, p. 
142).  The bureaucracy resisted reforms, as they would mean a loss of “power and privilege,” 
while the press, free now to criticize, accused the bureaucrats of being responsible for the goods 
shortages and state of health and social services (Goldfarb, 1987). Glasnost highlighted the 
frustrations created by the “gap between raised expectations and grim reality” (Goldfarb, 1987). 
Gorbachev’s economic reforms failed because he was unwilling to leave the centrally controlled 
economy (Silk, 1990). The economy was plagued by the “scourge of bureaucratic 
meddlesomeness” with 14 million farmhands being watched by 3 million apparatchiks, but doing 
away with the many bureaucrats involved in agriculture would anger the party and add to the 
unemployment problem (Silk, 1990). Reverting back to the Stalinist approach for a harsher 
centrally controlled economy with all the power in the hands of the leaders would mean that the 
state would have to go back to their former violent tactics (Silk, 1990), which Gorbachev was 
also unwilling to do, he wanted to keep the monster without the teeth. Gorbachev was unwilling 
to make deep changes to the system, and most of the reforms he attempted met with resistance 
from the party, while being found insufficient by the public.  
The new openness showed that the system was too flawed to stand up to criticism, and too weak 
to put down opposition. There was a “growing sense of exhilaration that freedoms were being 
openly debated” alongside the “the continuing - or worsening - shortages of food and consumer 
goods” (Luers, 1988). The new openness allowed people to talk about the many things wrong 
with the system, but did not change the problems that people could now talk about.  
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Glasnost had revolutionary implications for some aspects of the Soviet system (Daniels, 1993, p. 
17). “De-ideologizing” meant that the regime was giving up its main form of control (Daniels, 
1993, p. 17). Bringing the truth to light did not rest well with old party members, and Gorbachev 
faced serious opposition from within his own government (Daniels, 1993, p. 18). The 
bureaucracy fought amongst themselves and opposed Gorbachev’s reforms, making it difficult 
for anything to be accomplished.  
By the late 1980s, it was clear that Perestroika would not be enough to save to USSR. Even the 
strongest supporters of perestroika, including Gorbachev, expressed grave concern that it is 
producing no material benefits for the people, and “that their standard of living may actually be 
declining and that it may be years before this bleak picture changes” (Luers, 1988). Gorbachev 
said that “The existing political system proved incapable of protecting us from the growth of 
stagnation phenomena in economic and social life in the latter decades, and doomed the reforms 
undertaken at the time of failure” (“Key Sections,” 1988).  
The new openness allowed simmering nationalist and anti-Russian feelings to come to the 
surface, along with suppressed anger over the past mistreatments that glasnost was now allowing 
to be discussed. Countries called for more political independence from Moscow, setting up their 
own governments, then calling for complete independence (Riding, 1990). In the 1990s, 
countries were demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops (Riding, 1990). This increasing 
nationalism, and the USSR’s inability to check the loss of its subordinates further weakened the 
single party system. 
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Nationalist feeling in Poland had always been strong (White, 2001, p. 52), and when the Soviets 
began allowing more political freedoms, the Poles did away with the communist government in 
favor of a more nationalist one (p. 52). When popular political action in Poland overthrew the 
Soviet regime in 1989 (White, 2001, p. 52), the Soviets, unable to repress the rising tide of 
revolution, ignored it, and instituted a new policy of not intervening in the revolutions occurring 
in Soviet Satellites/Soviet sphere of influence, giving other countries the courage to overthrow 
the Soviet regime (p. 52).  
In 1989, Hungary legalized opposition groups, ending four decades of single party rule, and the 
Communist party was order to disband its cells in the workplace (Rueters). Gorbachev did 
nothing to stop this, and had paved the way for it to happen with the loosening of control.  
Gorbachev did intervene several times when the USSR was collapsing. When Lithuania became 
the first Soviet republic to declare its independence (Fein, 1990), Gorbachev, in his “harshest 
attempt thus far” threatened them with cutting off needed supplies (Clines, 1990), a far cry from 
the USSR’s former readiness to use force against rebellions. Gorbachev feared that the 
Lithuanian rebellion would encourage other republics to challenge state authority (Clines 1990).  
The Soviet Parliament described the resolution as “not legally binding,” but at Gorbachev’s 
encouragement, the Parliament did not deal harshly with the Lithuanians, confirming “the right 
of every republic to secede,” but saying that until the mechanisms for seceding were made law, 
the Lithuanian Parliament could not legally secede (Fein, 1990).  
In 1991, Gorbachev used violence against Lithuanian rebels, resulting in the deaths of 15 
protestors (Whitney, 1991), and the wounding of over a 100 (Fein, 1991). Hundreds of thousands 
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of Russians, Poles, and Byelorussians walked to Vilnius to attend the funerals and protest 
Moscow’s actions (Whitney, 1991). Many newspapers sharply criticized Soviet actions, and 
accused Soviet leaders (who blamed Lithuanians for the violence) of giving false versions of 
events (Fein, 1991).  
State run media attempted to sway public opinion on the use of force in Lithuania by justifying 
the violence with a version contradicted by eyewitness reports (Fein, 1991). The authorities also 
used its monopoly on the paper supply as a more insidious way of controlling information (Fein, 
1991). When freedom of the press began to backfire on him, Gorbachev attempted (too late) to 
crack down. To contain the criticism against him, Gorbachev called for suspension of freedom of 
the press (Fein, 1991). The freedom of the press and the ability to criticize the government that 
Gorbachev had insisted was necessary was undermining the legitimacy and control of the party. 
The idea of restricting the press and the freedom to criticize the government was frightening to 
many people and Gorbachev’s proposal was met with widespread consternation (Fein, 1991). 
Gorbachev’s crackdown caused accusations of him wanting to hide his crimes and avoid the 
same criticism he had doled out to his predecessors. (Fein, 1991). Feebly trying to restrict newly 
granted freedoms once they got in the way caused anger and discontent and further undermined 
party legitimacy.  
Gorbachev also rejected the independence bids of Estonia and Latvia when they attempted to 
follow Lithuania’s example, but did not threaten them, merely stated that they had no legal right 
to secede (Bohlen, 1990). He did not punish or threaten Latvia and Estonia, instead leaving the 
“door open for dialogue” (Bohlen, 1990). Considering that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had all 
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been forcibly incorporated in to the Soviet Union (Fein, 1990), even the USSR’s actions against 
Lithuania were incredibly mild, and seemed more out of a desperate attempt at stemming the 
trend towards independence than an assertion of party control.   
Czechoslovakia demanded that Soviet troops be withdrawn, and gave a deadline; the Soviets 
complained that the deadline was too short, but considered the demands reasonable (Kamm, 
1991). Removing the troops after practically being ordered to do so by Czechoslovakia showed 
the weakening Soviet power and the strengthening nationalist hold. Hungary followed suit and 
also demanded removal of Soviet troops (Riding, 1990), and other countries followed in their 
demands.  
As it became more obvious that Perestroika had failed, Gorbachev faced increasing criticism 
from within his own party. Yeltsin called for Gorbachev’s resignation over his failed plans, and 
stirred up party and public disapproval (Clines, 1991a). In August1991, military and KGB 
authorities led a coup against Gorbachev’s government, accusing him of weakening the country 
through his reform programs (Clines, 1991, b). The attempted failed after two days, but it 
showed that the in-fighting party was no longer capable of governing the country (White, 2001, 
p. 69). Though the coup was not begun by the Communist Party, the leadership “did little to 
resist it,” allowing Yeltsin to suspend the CPSU (White, 2001, p. 69). The coup signaled the end 
of the USSR.  
After the coup, it was apparent that the USSR was broken, and Soviet countries increased their 
efforts at independence. Faced with the mass exodus of Soviet countries, Gorbachev, in an 
attempt to force party unity and “stem the flight of republics from a disintegrating nation,” 
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threatened to resign unless the Union could be preserved (Bohlen, 1991). This did not stop other 
nations from demanding independence (Bohlen, 1991).  
The single party state is more predictable than a personalist state, and is thus more reliable and 
stable, but also much harder to change (Suraska, 1998, p. 121). The resistance to change makes it 
vulnerable to internal decay and corruption, and makes it so resistant to new ideas that it 
becomes brittle and unable to cope with newly arising challenges, leading it to collapse inward 
on itself. 
Gorbachev realized that there were many problems with the old ways, but he did not want to 
completely overhaul the system. He did not want to completely indict the system, and insisted 
that “Naturally, Party organizations worked and the overwhelming majority of communists did 
their duty to the people sincerely and selflessly” (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 23). But he admitted that 
the party “lagged behind the requirements of the times and of life itself” (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 
23), the party had stagnated, and corruption was widespread (p. 22). Gorbachev failed to realize 
that the party was not capable of reform: the party members had only their own interests at stake, 
and the Central Committee foiled his attempts to change (Sternthal, 1997, p. 210). 
When Gorbachev called for a revision of history that would deal openly and honestly with the 
Stalin’s years, he did not realize the “possible consequences that such openness would have on 
the legitimacy of his own government” (Suraska, 1998, p. 13); Gorbachev and the ruling system 
faced criticism, and could not fix the problems without changing more than they were willing to. 
Gorbachev did not intend to change the regime’s core, only to better manage it, but the system 
was broken, and his attempts at openness only made that more obvious. Gorbachev’s reforms 
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undermined the legitimacy of his government, and failed to offer a viable replacement to the 
system they were undermining. The party had not let in new blood, and had no new ideas, but 
still clung to the old, failing ways. The predictability of the bureaucratic system gives it stability 
(Suraska, 1998, p. 121), taking away stability while undermining the system’s legitimacy made 
the already fragile system even more vulnerable to collapse. Gorbachev further undermined an 
already broken system without offering a good replacement. 
Gorbachev was ousted from power in 1991, only six years after beginning perestroika (Clines, 
1991). Before his fall, Gorbachev had backed down on some of his reforms in an attempt to 
pacify hard line party members (Clines, 1991b), and had swayed between allowing more 
freedom of the press, and trying to limit it when it criticized him (Fein, 1991). But the USSR had 
already collapsed by the time Gorbachev was removed from power. Republics had declared 
independence, and aside from the few times the regime tried to use violence, had gone 
peacefully.   By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had collapsed, Gorbachev resigned, and the 
Russia that was left had very little control over the remaining associated republics (Clines, 





LIBYA UNDER COLONEL QADDAFI AS A PERSONALIST REGIME 
 
Typical of a personalist leader, Qaddafi came to power by means of a military coup (Bernstein, 
1984b). Under Qaddafi, power theoretically lay with a system of people’s committees and the 
indirectly elected General People’s Congress, but in practice those structures were manipulated 
to ensure the continued dominance of Qaddafi (Freedom House, 2010). In December 1969, 
Egyptian intelligence helped disrupt a plot by the Libyan defense and interior ministers to 
overthrow Qaddafi, apparently triggered by unease over the growing radicalism of Qaddafi’s 
regime (Eljahmi, 2006). Qaddafi survived the attempted coup, but “concluded that his power 
depended upon tight control” (Eljahmi, 2006). His Revolutionary Command Council issued a 
“Law for the Protection of the Revolution,” which made it a criminal offense to “proselytize 
against the state, to arouse class hatred, to spread falsehood, or to participate in strikes and 
demonstrations” (Eljahmi, 2006). Within weeks, the Revolutionary Command Council assumed 
total public control over Libya, and Qaddafi took control as both prime minister and defense 
minister; in this role, he restricted any significant authority beyond family and his closest 
associates (Eljahmi, 2006). Qaddafi acted without worry about reelection, repressed political 
dissent, and was not checked in his actions by any institutions since they were all subject to him. 
Qaddafi was willing to “kill potential rivals” and he ruthlessly repressed dissent in his erratic but 
relatively efficient police state (Miller, 1986b). Amnesty International accused him of 
“liquidating” his opponents and expressed outrage at the “arbitrary” arrest and execution without 





attack (Associated Press, 1984). Throughout his rule, he faced discontent from his troops and 
people, which he met with violence.  
At first, thanks to Libya’s oil money, roads, hospitals, schools, and housing were built, while life 
expectancy, literacy rates, and per capita income drastically increased (MacFarquhar, p. 3, 2011). 
But at the same time, Qaddafi, introduced “Orwellian revolutionary committees in every 
neighborhood to purge the country of the ideologically unsound” and began demanding that the 
entire country follow his every whim, from his views on sports (boxing is barbaric), to his (very 
short-lived) insistence that people raise chickens (MacFarquhar, p. 3, 2011). His “mercurial 
changes in policy and personality…began in earnest” with the publishing of his Green Book 
(MacFarquhar, p. 3, 2011). His Green Book contained “a mixture of Islamic belief and socialist 
theory” that were meant to provide “principle and structures of government” but the document 
lacked “legal status” (Freedom House, 1998). Qaddafi’s Green Book was, at his insistence, 
taught in schools as a foundation of education, and teachers were forced to teach his profound 
views on the differences between men and women (women menstruate, men do not), or risk 
imprisonment and possible execution (BBC, 2011f).  
Under Qaddafi, there was no independent press: state-owned media largely operated as 
“mouthpieces for the authorities, and journalists worked in a climate of fear and self-censorship” 
(Freedom House, 2010), and those who displeased the regime face harassment or imprisonment 
on trumped-up charges (Freedom House, 2010). It was necessary for Qaddafi to minimize any 
kind of dissent, or widespread unification among the masses, and he used his control of the 
media to achieve that end. Qaddafi also used the media to encourage obedience to him, covering 
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the streets in posters bearing slogans such as “Obey those in authority” and “Every shepherd has 
his own flock” (Elijahmi, 2006). Qaddafi espoused Islam in his Green Book, and tried to use 
religion to legitimize himself, often paralleling himself with Muhammad, Abraham, and the 
angel Gabriel (Elijahmi, 2006), but the fact that religion went second to his personal decisions 
detracted from any semblance of religious right to rule. In his book, he claimed to believe in 
democracy and the will of the people (Qaddafi, 1988, p. 15), but his revolutionary committees 
forced their will on the congresses against the will of the people.    
Under his rule, it was illegal for any political group to oppose the principles of the 1969 
revolution, laid out in the Green Book, political parties were outlawed, and the government 
strictly monitored political activity (Freedom House, 2010). Organizing or joining anything 
remotely like a political party was punishable by long prison terms and the death sentence 
(Freedom House, 2010). Elections included mandatory voting, but elections were a sham, and 
the real power lay with Qaddafi and his small group of supporters (Freedom House, 1998).  
 Qaddafi built “a network of controls and repression” that existed at every level of society; the 
press was censored, private commerce was restricted, his Green Book was taught in every 
school, and every level of society from the police to government bureaus was ruled by his 
Revolutionary Committees, who “encouraged political ardor” and watched every move of the 
other institutions (Bernstein, 1984c). His Revolutionary Committees, ostensibly created to allow 
Libyans to rule themselves, were seen as “instruments of the deepening political oppression,” 
and were described by Libyans as “an open sham” and “merely a screen for the real power” 
(Miller, 1984b). When opposition increased, so too did the power of the Revolutionary 
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Committees (Miller, 1984b). His regime restricted personal freedoms and quashed political 
dissent, often resorting to violence. Qaddafi warned that anyone who tried to organize politically 
that he could “at any moment send them to the People's Court … and the People’s Court will 
issue a sentence of death based on this law, because execution is the fate of anyone who forms a 
political party,” and publicly hung and mutilated his opponents (Eljhami, 2006).  
In Qaddafi’s Libya, corruption was pervasive in the private sector and the government, ranking 
130 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions 
Index (Freedom House, 2010). Qaddafi ruled Libya by decree, with an almost total absence of 
accountability and transparency (Freedom House, 1998). Qaddafi acquired more and more 
personal power, and used that to place his family and friends in positions of power. The NYT 
reported the state department as describing Libya as “a kleptocracy in which the regime — either 
the al-Qadhafi family itself or its close political allies — has a direct stake in anything worth 
buying, selling or owning” (Lichtblau, Rohde, & Risen, 2011). Qaddafi’s family acquired vast 
personal wealth, with family members in the energy sector, security, health, aviation, 
construction and more, with many of them frequently demanding bribes (Lichtblau, Rohde, & 
Risen, 2011). His sons were known for their debauchery and lavish lifestyles (Pargeter, 2012, p. 
6), living in palatial homes and partying with Hollywood stars (Lichtblau, Rohde, & Risen, 
2011). Qaddafi allowed this because personalist leaders must maintain their support base, usually 
made up of family and close friends. If he did not allow the widespread corruption that was rife 
in his regime, then his supporters had no reason to side with him against the people they were 
stealing from.  
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Qaddafi arbitrarily changed rules, keeping Libya in a constant state of disarray. He switched the 
calendar from the standard Muslim one to one that counted from Muhammad’s death rather than 
his birth, he renamed February to “Lights” and August to “Hannibal” because he did not like 
their original names (MacFarquhar, 2001). Qaddafi’s “erratic” decision making was evident in 
abruptly suggested agendas at sessions that were randomly called: when these sessions were 
called, all offices, schools, government offices, airlines, and shops, were forced to close for the 
sometimes weeks long sessions, meaning a huge loss of revenue, but failure to comply meant 
stiff fines and license suspension, while people were also required to show their stamped session 
attendance records on demand (MacFarquhar, 2001).  
Declining oil revenues in the 1980s meant austerity measures along with raised prices and taxes, 
and added to popular discontent (Miller, 1984b). Private enterprise was discouraged, resulting in 
the closing (sometimes by government order, sometimes through pressure) of many small stores 
and in shortage of many items, such as groceries (Miller, 1984b). The drop in oil prices cut 
Libya’s income by more than two-thirds, and led to shortages of food and other commodities and 
lines “rivaling those of Eastern Europe;” Critics accused Qaddafi of taking an oil-rich nation and 
turning it an “impoverished police state” (Miller, 1986b). In the midst of the austerity, Qaddafi 
spent an estimated $10 billion in a “solidarity conference” aimed at solidifying his status (Miller, 
1984b). The failing economy combined with the lavish lifestyles of Qaddafi and his family 
further alienated the public and his support base.  
When oil prices went back up, Libyans still saw little benefit from the increase, and complained 
about the poor condition of the roads, and the inadequacy of the health care and transportation 
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services (MacFarquhar, 2001). The youth of Libya lacked meaningful employment, and many 
people had not seen a wage increase in 20 years, and income steadily declined (MacFarquhar, 
2001). 
 The military resented Qaddafi’s stated plan to replace them with “an armed people” (Miller, 
1986b). Qaddafi’s statement that he wanted “a society without police or traditional armed forces” 
and that “the regular army will disappear in the future and the people will replace them” (Miller, 
1986a), weakened his support base in the military, without really giving him credence with the 
people. The suspected killing of an officer who had protested Qaddafi’s policies towards Egypt 
added to military discontent with his leadership (Miller, 1986a). His erratic violence against his 
supporters angered them and gave them no reason to remain loyal to him. When Qaddafi used 
force to put down a rebellion attempt by high ranking army officers, the state media made no 
mention of the event and Libyan officials stated that there was no unrest, despite Western reports 
of casualties, bombing raids, explosions at arms depots, and purges of senior military officers 
(Hedges, 1993). Qaddafi used his control of the press to keep opposition as secret as possible, 
preventing any widespread unification, and preventing the further undermining of his legitimacy.  
Dissent in the early part of his rule was difficult to measure because Qaddafi insisted that none 
existed, the state-run media corroborated his claim, and Libyans were “largely sealed off from 
contact with foreigners,” still, an increase in discontent was apparent (Bernstein, 1984a). After 
public hangings of two student dissidents (hangings carried out by student activists, but with the 
apparent support of the government), Qaddafi faced “the most volatile opposition” he had faced 
since coming to power (Bernstein, 1984a). One of the executioners was stabbed to death a day 
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after the hanging, anti-government slogans were carved into roadways, a fire created by arsonists 
destroyed the main auditorium of the campus where the hangings took place, and attacks on 
military installations and acts of sabotage were reported in the weeks following the hangings 
(Bernstein, 1984a).  Two failed assassination attempts in 1985 were orchestrated by dissident 
military men who were “said to be in a power struggle with the Revolutionary Committees,” and 
resulted in the execution of about 75 officers (Associated Press, 1985). Dissent slowly increased 
throughout his rule, and his actions caused him to lose many supporters.   
This friction supports the findings of those who said that personalist regimes are highly 
vulnerable to internal and civil conflict, and Qaddafi took the route that personalist leaders are 
bound by their type to take: an increase of personal control, implemented forcefully. Raising 
security measures was Qaddafi’s response to opposition (Bernstein, 1984a). After a May 8th 
insurgent attack, the Revolutionary Committees arrested between 2,000 and 20,000 people, and 
though the actual attackers were found and killed within hours, the arrests and interrogations 
continued for weeks as Qaddafi used the situation to “root out the regime’s other political and 
economic opponents” (Miller, 1984b). All the May 8
th
 attackers were killed and Qaddafi insisted 
that they were not representative of his adoring Libyan public, but were carried out by enemies 
from outside, possibly the US and Britain working through the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
denounced the US, Britain, and the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists and enemies of the 
revolution (Dionne, 1984).  This path of action is the one that most personalist leaders take; their 
regime type leaves them little choice but to resort to violent repression, but it also leads to their 
downfall, because their actions force the situation to escalate to the point where violent uprising 
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is the only option, and eventually, their support base is so weakened that they must lose in a 
confrontation.  
Despite Qaddafi’s enormous personal power, he was not able to maintain perfect control 
(Bernstein, 1984c). His programs that called to abolish elementary schools and his mandatory 
military training for schoolgirls met with resistance, and his resolution for military training did 
not pass before  parliament, but despite this, was passed after Qaddafi made a speech that 
criticized parliament (Bernstein, 1984c). In 1984, Qaddafi was facing “quiet but growing 
resistance to his radical economic and social policies” in Libya (Miller, 1984a). Between May 
and September of 1984, thousands of Libyans were arrested or detained due to their resistance to 
Qaddafi’s policies, and Qaddafi was described as “a leader increasingly at war with his own 
country” (Miller, 1984b).  
15 years after coming to power, Qaddafi was firmly in control, but faced “growing opposition 
and a dwindling support base” (Miller, 1984b). The failing economy, poor public services, and 
his harsh treatment of dissenters made enemies of those not directly benefiting from his rule (his 
friends and family); his constant interference in the economy stifled growth and angered business 
med and consumers alike; and by threatening to make the military obsolete and punishing senior 
officers, he was making enemies of the military. Qaddafi was not only alienating his support 
base, but he was giving them far more reasons to risk fighting him than to stay under a regime 
where there seemed to be no hope of things becoming better, and a very good chance of being 
killed if they tried for change.   
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In 1986, a bomb exploded in a West Berlin disco, killing two U.S servicemen and a Turkish 
woman, and 229 people (Malinarich, 2011). Reagan blamed Libya, and said that the US had 
intercepted messages from Tripoli that proved that Qaddafi was behind the attack (Malinarich, 
2011). The US Air Force targeted Tripoli and Benghazi, and in the failed attempt to kill Qaddafi, 
killed his baby daughter and 15 civilians (Malinarich, 2011). In 1988, the Lockerbie bombing 
was widely attributed to Libya and Qaddafi, possibly in retaliation for the air raid that killed his 
daughter, and UN sanctions were imposed (Freedom House, 1998). Despite international anger 
and the UN sanctions Qaddafi protected the accused bombers, and did not accept responsibility 
for the bombing until 2003, and then only in vague terms that did not implicate him personally 
(BBC, 2011g). Qaddafi lost international support due to his terrorist activities, UN and US 
sanctions severely affected Libya, and although it still had money from its oil exports, the 
economy suffered (Freedom House, 1998).  
Throughout the 90s, Qaddafi faced continual opposition from his people, and showed his 
willingness to punish large groups of people on suspicion alone, as well as his ability to punish 
dissenters abroad. When faced with another assassination attempt in 1998, he imprisoned at least 
100 people on the suspicion that they might have been involved (Freedom House, 1998). In 
1997, Qaddafi enacted a law that allowed “collective punishment” for communities accused of 
supporting his opposers, cutting off public services and food subsidies to areas where he believed 
people opposed him (Freedom House 1998). In 1996, one of Qaddafi’s most prominent critics, 
Mansur Kikhiya, a secretary general of the exile opposition National Libyan Alliance, 
disappeared from Cairo; it was believed that he had been brought back to Libya, and executed 
(Freedom House 1998). 
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In the 1990s, Qaddafi was facing serious conflict within his group of elite supporters, and even 
within his own family (Freedom House, 1998). By 1999, the economy was stagnate thanks to the 
sanctions imposed after the Lockerbie bombing, unemployment was high, and the infrastructure 
of the government was falling apart thanks to the friction amongst his supporters (Freedom 
House, 2002). As the already chaotic regime was losing all semblance of order, Qaddafi began 
trying to repair his international image. In 1999, he gave up the two Libyan nationals accused in 
the Lockerbie bombing (Freedom House 2002), and in 2003, accepted Libyan responsibility for 
Lockerbie, giving compensation to the families of the dead (Malinarich, 2011). In response, the 
UN suspended sanctions which were completely done away with after the trial of the bombing 
suspects, and the US eased trade restrictions (Freedom House, 2002). Qaddafi’s attempts to 
improve his image made it seem that the situation would improve in Libya, but even after the 
sanctions were lifted he acted erratically, accusing the US of coercing the judges in the bombing 
trial, and demanded compensation for the victims of the US’s foreign policy (Freedom House 
2002). Qaddafi continued to face conflict among his supporters, he was forced to allow 
widespread corruption to maintain loyalty, further impoverishing the people in a troubled 
economy (Freedom House, 2002). In an attempt to improve the economy, Qaddafi eased state 
control of the economy and jailed 47 bank and government officials for corruption (Freedom 
House, 2002).   
 
In 2003, Qaddafi renounced weapons of destruction and agreed to pay millions more to the 
families of the Lockerbie and Berlin bombings in hopes of removing the sanctions that were 
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hampering its failing economy (Freedom House, 2004). The US suspended sanctions and 
Qaddafi resumed some diplomatic relations with Europe and the US, but it faced accusations of 
supporting an assignation plot in Saudi Arabia and a failed coup in Mauritania, weakening 
international support (Freedom House, 2005).    
In the 2000s, Qaddafi began making moves to improve conditions in Libya (Freedom House, 
2005). State control of the economy and media were loosened, and Libya began to repair its 
international relations (Freedom House, 2007). Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, was considered to 
be largely responsible for the policy changes; he criticized the leadership and the conditions in 
Libya and facilitated reports of abuse through his charitable organization (Freedom House, 
2007). The shift in economic policy in the 2000s gave little actual benefit to the people, and 
though state control was loosened, there was still next to no political freedom (Freedom House, 
2007). Additionally, Qaddafi still had complete control and spoke of the need to kill Libya’s 
enemies (Freedom House, 2010).  
In 2009, the government faced opposition in the Southeast of Libya which it met with violence 
that resulted in considerable loss of life (Freedom House, 2009). In 2009, the convicted 
Lockerbie bomber was released due to his terminal illness, and Libya welcomed him back as a 
hero (Freedom House, 2010). In 2009, the regime restricted the press still more, and state run 
media became nothing but a mouthpiece for the regime, doing away with any hope for freedom 
of the press (Freedom House, 2010).  
Qaddafi’s attempts to change and public assurances that the situation would improve turned out 
to be empty promises, and by 2010, Libya had returned to its violent ways, but kept up the 
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promise that things would get better. The loosening of state control followed by the regime’s 
return to control angered the people because the regime was taking away the freedoms Libyans 
had grown accustomed to, and was only offering them the (now obviously empty) assurance that 
things would change. The criticisms of Saif al-Islam weakened the regime further, his criticisms 
highlighted the failings of the regime, and the reforms passed in response to his criticisms gave 
little to no actual improvement.  
According to Condoleezza Rice, Libya suffered from conditions that were “inherently unstable 
— a youth bulge, high unemployment, a lack of political openness” (Schmitt, 2011). In 2009, 
Qaddafi admitted that “the administration has failed and the state economy has failed” though he 
did not take personal responsibility for these failings (Slackman). He made a few half-hearted 
concessions, but in 2006, Qaddafi urged his supporters to “kill enemies” who asked for political 
change (Rueters), quashing hopes that his regime may have changed.  
Influenced by uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, and pushed to anger by the arrest of a human 
rights activist in Benghazi, Libyans began to rebel against Qaddafi’s regime (Freedom House, 
2012). In 2011, Libyans began peaceful demonstrations, Qaddafi responded by killing “hundreds 
of people” (Schmitt). As late as February 2011, Qaddafi was insisting not only that all his people 
loved him, but that there were not and had not been any protests in Tripoli, and that he could not 
step down because that power lay with the people, not with him (“Libya Protests”). After being 
forced to admit that at least some of Libya did not love him, Qaddafi vowed to track down and 
kill protesters “house by house,” and the crackdown in the capital resulted in a high death count, 
but outside the capital, a growing number of towns declared their independence without security 
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forces making any apparent attempt to stop them (Fahim & Kirkpatrick, 2011a). Qaddafi tried 
some concessions, releasing journalists who had been detained (Kirkpatrick, 2011b), and 
allowing some freedom of press (before quickly changing his mind) (Kirkpatrick, 2011a): these 
concessions contrasted sharply with his simultaneous shows of violence, and his erratic behavior 
made him appear weak.  
Despite his grandiose vows to “fight on to the last drop of my blood,” Qaddafi was seen as 
“weak” and “a liar” by the rebels, and defections continued among the military, many of whom 
were described as just taking off their uniforms and switching sides (Fahim & Kirkpatrick, 
2011a). When Qaddafi showed signs of weakening, large numbers of government officials and 
military personnel defected to join the revolt, and several senior officials publicly broke with 
Qaddafi, resigning over his actions towards the rebels (Kirkpatrick & El-Naggar, 2011b). Rebel 
forces benefitted from the experience and leadership of the defecting military personnel, who 
established a unified command, and brought tanks, antiaircraft guns, and weapons to the rebel 
side (Kirkpatrick & Fahim, 2011).  
Though cities all along Libya’s eastern coast appeared to be controlled by Qaddafi’s opponents, 
supported by defecting soldiers and police officers, that control “seemed tenuous and largely 
subject to the whims of the colonel’s feared militias and mercenaries, along with helicopters and 
fighter planes” (Fahim, 2011). Qaddafi’s power “dissolved with astonishing speed” as rebels 
marched into the capital and took control of the city, and though Qaddafi and the officials loyal 
to him still claimed he was in power, he still went into hiding (Fahim & Kirkpatrick, 2011b). The 
revolution ended in his overthrow and violent death (Fahim, Shadid, & Gladstone, 2011).  
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Once the revolution came fully under way, anger and desire for change combined with the 
knowledge that “failure to remove Colonel Qaddafi would mean death” (Fahim, 2011), forcing 
the rebels to commit to unify and commit to the revolution. By the time people were ready to 
violently rebel, the risk of losing was too great for them to back down. Qaddafi’s actions against 
those who opposed him in the past meant certain death for the rebels if Qaddafi remained in 
power, so continuing to fight was worth the risk as there was at least an opportunity for hope.   
In Libya, the people revolted violently out of anger and frustration, and because they saw a 
chance of success thanks to the revolutions occurring elsewhere in the Arab world, but the revolt 
might not have become a revolution if the regime had not vacillated in its use of force. Qaddafi 
began to loosen control to a very small extent, but that worked against him because he gave 
enough to give his people the hope and expectation that things could be better, without giving 
them enough to keep them satisfied with his regime. His concessions gave the appearance of 
weakness, and made him vulnerable to opposition.  The revolution in Libya occurred when 
people did not get what they felt entitled to, when the regime gave the appearance of weakness, 
and when people were angered enough to risk the consequences of fighting. 
Libyans seized the chance and began a rebellion when the regime’s inconsistencies gave the 
appearance of weakness. Qaddafi’s sporadic use of violence angered people while giving them 
hope that his inconsistency was a sign of weakness. And by the time that Qaddafi began trying to 
firmly put down dissent, the opposition had picked up enough power that it could face the 
weakening state. Qaddafi’s actions made life seem continually more unpleasant, making people 
angry that he was taking away things they had grown used to. The regime gave the appearance of 
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weakness when it hesitated in using force, and since Qaddafi had no loyal support throughout 
























I hypothesized that single party regimes collapse peacefully because opposition can only arise 
once the system has already broken. In my research, I found evidence that the USSR undermined 
its own system to the point where it could not withstand opposition. The USSR’s strength lay in 
its complete control that permeated every level of society and its adaptability. When it became 
too afraid to use its social coalitions to repress dissent and crush opposition, and too attached to 
the old ways and the old leaders to make the necessary changes for survival, the regime became 
fossilized, and when opposition arose, the regime simply fell apart.  
The USSR consistently acted in a way that undermined its own legitimacy, power, and control 
without being willing to adapt sufficiently to survive without them. The regime’s choice of 
leaders after Stalin showed a resistance to change, that combined with an apparent inability to 
use sufficient force to crush dissent, proved fatal to the regime. The party chose Khrushchev 
because they could not continue in Stalin’s violent footsteps, but the regime also failed to adapt 
to a new way of doing things. Khrushchev’s criticisms of Stalin and his regime undermined the 
legitimacy of a regime that had based much of its power in its public infallibility, while his 
inability to force the party to pass reforms left the party weaker than when he came to it. 
Khrushchev publicly criticized a system he could not fix, causing discontent that threatened the 
party. The regime returned to harsher leadership out of fear, not strength, and the choice of 
Brezhnev as a leader reflected that. The party was trying to cling to the old ways when it was 
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already too weak to continue in them. Brezhnev’s shows of force kept the regime afloat, but the 
period of stagnation under his leadership weakened the regime further.   
The choice of Andropov and Chernenko as leaders show the party clinging to the old ways, their 
choice of leaders who were dying of old ages shows that the party had lost its ability to adapt, 
and was favoring individuals and old habits over the machine like apparatus that made the party 
strong.  
Gorbachev was chosen when it was becoming painfully obvious that the party had to change, but 
though Gorbachev’s reforms were too drastic for the party, even he was not interested in 
changing the system. His reforms were too weak to begin, and once they made it through the 
party, they were significantly watered down. The half-hearted attempts at modernization and 
liberalization, stifled by the bureaucracy, were more detrimental to the system than outright 
oppression. They showed a weakness in the leadership, and were not strong enough to achieve 
the goals of a more prosperous economy and more employment that would have kept the system 
afloat.  They failed to offer a viable alternative to communism, or to improve the current system 
enough to allow it to remain in place.  
The USSR made concessions that showed weakness, ignored uprisings instead of repressing 
them, and ultimately showed themselves to be too brittle to continue to rule. The USSR’s 
concessions show they had lost the will to govern. They were too afraid, too old, and too brittle 
to use their state apparatus to rid themselves of opposition. The Soviets grew too inflexible to 
keep up with the times, and too old and frightened to use the necessary force to keep themselves 
in power. They irreparably damaged the system that had made them strong, and when opposition 
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arose, they collapsed because they were incapable of doing anything else. My research supports 





I hypothesized that personalist regimes are overthrown violently because they allow no avenue 
for peaceful political input, push people to the point where they are willing to face violence, and 
lack the social coalitions to repress the dissent they inevitably create. Qaddafi supporters were 
loyal to him for what they could get out of it, so he was forced to allow corruption to keep 
supporters, and the corruption and erratic took away legitimacy from his regime, and continually 
created opposition that had to be put down violently, in turn creating more opposition.  
Qaddafi alienated the bureaucracy by continually overruling them and threatening to disband 
them, alienated the military by killing high ranking and respected leaders who opposed him and 
by threatening to replace them with an armed society, alienated educators by threatening them 
with violence if they did not teach his book, alienated business people by interfering in the 
economy, alienated religious leaders by putting himself before religion, and alienated all his 
people with his erratic violent punishments of dissent. Qaddafi’s actions meant that he had no 
strong, loyal support base throughout society that would support him and work to put down 
dissent. Because of this, he was continually forced to use violence against all the sectors of 
society that could have given him the legitimacy and support to put down dissent. The 
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bureaucracy could have given him legitimacy in putting down dissent, the military could support 
him in use of force and in maintaining order, business people could have supported him, and 
educators and religious leaders could have taught ideology that would make Qaddafi appear to be 
a legitimate leader. If Qaddafi had these social coalitions backing him, his decisions would have 
gone deep into every level of society, and his opposers would not be facing one man and his few 
friends, but all of society. But by continually violently forcing people to obey his every edict, 
and handing irrational, arbitrary punishments, Qaddafi alienated those who could have supported 
him in repressing dissent. Qaddafi was therefore forced to use violence to repress dissent, which 
in turn created more dissent, which escalated to where he could not put it down, and he was 
violently overthrown. This supports my hypothesis that personalist regimes collapse violently 
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